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Abstract: The Watershed Rules and Regulations, created by New York City’s 
Department of Environmental Protection, influence several facets of law, 
including the ability of local governments to regulate actions such as 
construction.  Several landowners in the affected area have taken issue with the 
regulation.  Specifically, they challenge the constitutionality of the city’s 
extraterritorial control on outside municipalities because of the resulting 
diminutive effect of the regulations on private property values.  This article 




I.  Introduction 
 
 New York City’s Department of Environmental Protection  (DEP) has  
authority to regulate land use over a region that encompasses 2000 square 
miles, 1.2 million acres, nine counties and seventy local governments. In a state 
with a strong tradition of conferring home rule authority on its cities, towns and 
villages, this is a curious exception.  
 
 On May 1, 1997, the Watershed Rules and Regulations became effective. In 
addition to regulating the discharge, handling and storage of a variety of 
chemicals, wastes and hazardous substances, the regulations directly affect the 
development of land and the jurisdiction of local governments to regulate land 
uses. These regulations have encountered serious resistance among affected 
landowners and have caught the attention of local officials whose cooperation in 
their enforcement is anticipated under a memorandum of agreement signed on 
January 21, 1997.  
 
 In Loft Corporation v. City of New York (New York Law Journal, July 1, 1997 
at 36 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1997)), over fifty landowners in Putnam County brought nine 
separate actions against the City.  They allege that the City’s enforcement of the 
watershed regulations causes injury that requires compensation under Public 
Health Law § 1105 and violates the just compensation clause of the state 
constitution. A number of issues regarding these regulations, their enforceability 
and the liability of the City for the diminution of property values have been raised 
since the regulations were issued, many of which are discussed by Judge 
Hickman in the Loft Corporation case. 
 
II. How Do the Regulations Impact Private Land Development and Local Home 
Rule Authority? 
 
First, they prevent most construction activity within 100 feet of a watercourse 
or 300-500 feet of a reservoir, reservoir stem or controlled lake (§§18-36-18-39). 
Of particular note are restrictions on the construction in these buffer zones of 
subsurface discharge sewage treatment systems and of most impervious 
surfaces such as roads, driveways, sidewalks and roofs.  Second, in designated 
60 day travel zones and phosphorus restricted basins, the construction of new 
surface discharge wastewater treatment plants is prohibited (§36(b) & (d)). Such 
plants are deemed necessary to serve the needs of larger scale development 
projects. DEP may approve the construction of such plants over time, if the local 
governments complete a number of planning studies (§ 18-82(b)(3)). Since these 
studies will take years to complete, the development potential of significant areas  
will not be known to landowners for some time.  
 
In Putnam County, the DEP anticipates the participation of local governments 
in the “Croton Plan.”  This, in turn, may require amendments to local 
comprehensive plans and land use regulations. Substantial portions of four of the 
six towns in Putnam County are located in phosphorus restricted and 60 day 
travel time basins. Where surface wastewater plants are allowed to be 
constructed will have great influence over where significant development projects 
will be located; normally this is a function of local policy and regulation.  
 
III.  Is the City’s Use of it’s Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Constitutional? 
 
 In Loft, Judge Hickman writes that the extraterritorial jurisdiction of New York 
City “may well pose a serious constitutional issue.  Is it a proper exercise of 
extraterritorial power to induce municipalities to change their master plans?” The 
same question was raised  in 1977 by landowners who attacked legislation 
empowering the Adirondack Park Agency (APA) to regulate land uses in an area 
encompassing 12 counties, 92 towns and 15 villages. The Court of Appeals 
upheld the legislation noting that the “future of a cherished regional park is a 
matter of State concern.” The court held that the Act’s impairment of home rule is 
justified when “the motive is to serve a supervening State concern transcending 
local interests.” Wambat Realty Corp. v. New York (41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.E.2d 
581, 393 N.Y.S.2d  949 (1977)) 
 
The Public Health Law grants concurrent jurisdiction to the State Department 
of Health and the DEP, whose regulations and enforcement activities are subject 
to the approval of the State Commissioner of Health. In this legal regime, the 
DEP is operating like the Adirondack Park Agency, as a state delegate, charged 
with promoting a matter of state concern. The APA has authority to adopt land 
use plans and policies to which affected localities must conform. It is empowered 
to review and approve or disapprove local land use plans (N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 
805 & 807). The Court of Appeals had no trouble sustaining its constitutionality. 
 
 The mystery of the City’s jurisdiction is lessened by seeing it as analogous to 
the authority of the Adirondack Park Agency. The legislative scheme that 
empowers the City to regulate extraterritorially serves the broad state interest of 
protecting the quality of drinking water.  
 
IV. Are the Plaintiff’s Property Claims Ripe for Adjudication? 
 
 Judge Hickman wrote in Loft that the ongoing enforcement  by DEP of 
previous watershed regulations and  “obvious intention to actively enforce the 
new regulations are a sufficient basis to reject the City’s argument that the 
owners…must apply for and await rejection of a specific project before their 
claims are ripe.” To the City’s claim that the general rule of ripeness requires 
landowners to exhaust administrative remedies, such as applications for 
development permits and variances, Judge Hickman responds that there are 
exceptions to the ripeness rule, among which are “where such pursuits would be 
futile, or would cause irreparable injury.” 
 
 A principal case cited in Loft for the proposition that the plaintiff’s claims are 
ripe is Rockland Light & Power Co. v. City of New York (289 N.Y. 45, 45 N.E. 2d 
803 (1942).  Rockland involved the City’s plans to construct a dam that would 
deplete the flow of water passing potential water power sites owned by the 
plaintiffs and decrease the value of its land and business. This case is analogous 
in an important sense to the Loft case.  In both, the facts indicate that it could be 
years before the full impact on the plaintiffs’ land values could be fairly assessed. 
There, the analogy between the cases stops. There were no administrative 
remedies in the Rockland case available to the plaintiff. In Loft, the plaintiffs can 
apply for development permits and variances from the strict application of the 
regulations to prevent hardships (§ 18-23  & § 18.61).  Because of the availability 
of these remedies, the ripeness doctrine applicable in Loft would normally be 
derived from the regulatory context rather than the public works context.  
 
 In a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court this summer, the prudential 
reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction in regulatory takings cases were 
reviewed.  In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (117 S.Ct. 1659), the 
plaintiff based her claim on federal constitutional provisions similar to the state 
provisions relied on by the plaintiffs in Loft. The court noted that the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that she has received a “final decision regarding the application of 
the [challenged] regulation to the property at issue….”  The underlying idea, in 
the context of a challenge to land use regulations, is that “a court cannot 
determine whether a regulation has gone too far unless it knows how far the 
regulation goes.” In Loft a great deal is not known about how far the watershed 
regulations go. Whether, in this context, the plaintiffs’ claims are ripe is the major 
issue to be addressed on appeal. 
 
V. What Injury to Property Rights is Protected? 
 
 Judge Hickman’s opinion on the ripeness issue was influenced by  § 1105 of 
the Public Health Law which, in his view, provides a broad statutory cause of 
action to all persons whose “rights of property” are injuriously affected by DEP’s 
enforcement of the watershed regulations. The plaintiffs’ complaints allege a 
variety of injuries to their property rights.  These range from the taking of all 
economically beneficial use of their land to constraints on the marketability of 
land caused by the extensive time it will take to determine development potential 
under the regulations.  
 
 The general rule requiring compensation for injury to property rights in New 
York was set forth in St. Aubin v. Flacke (68 N.Y.2d 66, 496 N.E.2d 879, 505 
N.Y.S.2d 859 (1986)). The Court of Appeals required that property owners must 
prove that “all but a bare residue of the economic value of the parcels must have 
been destroyed by the regulation at issue.” The court further noted that “a 
property owner does not prove a taking solely by evidence that the value has 
been reduced by the regulation, even if it has been substantially reduced.”  To 
date, this has been the rule applied to proving injury to property rights unless the 
allegation is that the regulation serves as a guise for the condemnation of 
property for a public use, or that a fundamental right, such as the right to exclude 
others from one’s property, has been taken.  
 
 Unfortunately, § 1105 does not define what it means by its use of the term 
“rights of property.” The 1873 version of § 72 of the Public Health Law, from 
which § 1105 is descended, provided a cause of action to all persons affected by 
regulations which required the removal of any building. This century-old statute 
gave a cause of action to “all persons whose rights of property are injuriously 
affected by the enforcement of any such rule or regulation.” This statutory 
language was crafted nearly a half century before the U.S. Supreme Court first 
held that a police power regulation can, if it goes too far, constitute a taking of 
property rights. The legislature, acting in 1873 was more likely protecting the 
owner’s vested right in an existing building.  
 
 In 1953, this statutory cause of action was broadened to apply to the City of 
New York in recognition of its concurrent jurisdiction with the state board of 
health.  At that time, new language was added that extended the cause of action 
to “all injuries caused to the legitimate use or operation of such property ….” This 
language seems still to refer to damages caused by the removal of a building 
occasioned or required by the offending regulation.  Judge Hickman reads this 
language differently, seeing it as a transaction through which jurisdiction was 
given to DEP “specifically conditioned upon payment for any resulting injury to 
owners.”  He uses the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “injury” (“any damage 
done to another”) as sufficient to demonstrate what the legislature intended.  
“The Court thus construes PHL § 1105 to mean exactly what it states, namely, 
that all plaintiffs need show is a present ‘injury’ arising from the acts of the City.”  
Given this definition of the statute’s intent, to grant the City’s motion to dismiss 
would be in error since there is some evidence of “current injury” and depressed 
values in the real estate market. This would be sufficient to prove that the 
plaintiffs have been presently injured to some extent and that the case is ripe for 




 The stakes here are enormous, pitting the billions that the city and its rate 
payers will incur in constructing filtration plants against the billions that will 
allegedly be lost by private property owners whose lands are affected by the 
watershed regulations.  The mechanics of governance in the state are 
challenged: the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City is attacked as are the 
cooperative arrangements it has made with affected local governments whose 
home rule authority, in turn, is diminished by the regulations. The role of the 
courts and their prudential rules for avoiding controversies usually handled by 
administrative agencies established to determine rights and values prior to 
litigation is at issue as well. This is a drama well worth watching, and whose 
unfolding will greatly impact the future development of land, intergovernmental 
relations and land use litigation in the state.  
